Hello everyone. Today is Friday, May 9, 2025. We’ve now received comprehensive data from the Sino-Pakistani analysis of the India-Pakistan air battle. Let’s take a look at what happened. Chinese official sources, like Observer Network and Global Times, have reported on this, presenting data obtained by the Chinese official side. However, I believe some things might be hidden or incomplete in this official account.

First, let’s cover the official version. The air battle lasted about two hours. Earlier reports of “a dozen” planes on each side were incorrect. The Indian Air Force (IAF) organized a large formation of over 80 aircraft (some say over 70, some over 80) on the morning of May 7. India has over 200 combat aircraft in total, so over 80 were mobilized. They launched attacks simultaneously from multiple directions and battle areas, including Srinagar, Rajastan, and three or four other strategic points. This operation was codenamed “Red Flag”.

Pakistan’s air force capabilities are limited due to its smaller national strength compared to India’s 1.4 billion population. Facing a large-scale IAF attack, Pakistan could not possibly defend everywhere, meaning some Indian attacks were bound to succeed. The IAF sortie began in the early morning, between 2 AM and 3 AM. The Indian aircraft primarily carried stand-off attack munitions, like Storm Shadow cruise missiles and Rampage air-to-ground missiles. India knew not to cross the border this time, understanding the potential problems that would arise. Therefore, all attacks were launched from outside Pakistan’s air defense zone, staying within India’s own airspace. Pakistan also stayed within its own airspace. The engagement range was quite large and distant.

The IAF used systems like the S-400 air defense system and 9M96E air defense missiles in the battle. The IAF demonstrated a significant improvement in organizing combined surface missile and fighter aircraft firing zones compared to their 2019 air campaign organization ability.

However, for a border skirmish like this, deploying a large formation didn’t necessarily help India. Pakistan only needed to shoot down a few combat aircraft to deter the IAF and force them to stop. Since it was a border friction, neither side crossed the border. Pakistan’s strategy was simply to be able to shoot down a few of their planes.

The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) mobilized 30 to 40 aircraft. However, most of these were likely just for show or were old, with a limited combat range of perhaps 30-40 kilometers. Their role was minimal, essentially just taking off to show presence.

The IAF’s main objective was to strike ground targets in Pakistan using air-to-ground weapons and missiles.

Within the PAF formation, only eight J-10CE fighters were the main attackers, specifically tasked with targeting Indian fighters to make them understand the situation. (There’s a说法 (saying) of seven, but Chinese official sources might indicate eight). To ensure the safety of these eight J-10CEs, the PAF concentrated all its support capabilities, including AWACS, data link support, electromagnetic cover, and ground missile interception cover. Only two directions, Srinagar and Poonch, had formations of four J-10CEs each. These main formations were directed by AWACS, supported by electronic warfare aircraft for electromagnetic cover to blind Indian radars. The PAF’s main attack group used a complete system bought from China, giving them a more integrated support system than the IAF’s formation.

The IAF deployed over 80 electronic warfare-capable aircraft, a large number, but they were ponderous. Because India uses equipment from various countries (French, Russian, etc. – a “United Nations of equipment”), their fighter data links were not interconnected, requiring complex routing through AWACS and ground command centers. While the PAF deployed fewer aircraft than the IAF, the truly crucial ones were the eight J-10CEs. Their strength lay in their complete system: AWACS command, electronic warfare support, and multi-group, multi-directional cover for the main attack force.

The PAF’s goal was specifically to shoot down Indian fighter aircraft. Regarding the single-aircraft situational awareness capability, several of the IAF’s main combat aircraft, like the Su-30MKI, are equipped with N01M “Bars” passive electronically scanned array (PESA) radars. Even 15 years ago, around 2010, this radar’s performance wasn’t considered very good. Despite being PESA, its signal-to-noise ratio and back-end processing were poor. Russia’s public data shows its range for fighter-sized targets is only 120 to 150 kilometers. This performance is no longer superior to even some later-generation mechanically scanned array radars.

The French Rafale fighters are equipped with the Thales RBE2 active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, which is slightly better. However, its architecture is also outdated, not a fully digital array, and only has 838 T/R modules using last-generation components. Its claimed detection range for airborne targets is up to 200 kilometers, considered a significant technological leap for the IAF, but this range is likely not achieved in reality. The J-10CE’s radar is said to completely outclass these Indian radars. The main issue is that the J-10CE can see Indian planes and fire upon them from a much greater distance, while Indian planes cannot detect the J-10CE or its missile.

The Indian aircraft’s engagement range in this battle appeared to be around 80 to 100 kilometers. The J-10CE, theoretically, especially when paired with the PL-15E missile, should have a range of 200 kilometers (based on the original PL-15). The export version, PL-15E, is officially stated to have a reduced range of 145 kilometers. However, I suspect the Chinese official account is hiding something. The version sold to Pakistan, despite having the ‘E’ designation, might actually be the full-standard Chinese version with a range reaching 200 kilometers. This suggests China did not limit the capability for Pakistan, perhaps because they were fighting India.

The PL-15E air-to-air missile is completely unresolvable for the IAF because of its long range. Indian aircraft cannot see it or hide from it. Medium-range air combat engagements on the morning of May 7 occurred at distances beyond 160 kilometers. This implies the actual effective range of the PL-15E reached beyond 160 kilometers, not just the stated 145 kilometers. This range significantly exceeds all modern air-to-air missiles in the IAF’s inventory. The IAF’s R-77 missile, at 20,000 meters altitude and Mach 2 closing speed, has a range of around 100 kilometers. The Rafale, without the Meteor missile, uses the MICA missile with a range of only 60 kilometers. These Indian missiles are a generation behind the PL-15E. The IAF was completely outmatched in beyond-visual-range engagements.

Pakistan could detect Indian fighters and begin firing from over 160 kilometers away, possibly close to 200 kilometers, while Indian fighters had no idea they were being approached or targeted. Both the J-10CE’s AESA radar and the PL-15E missile’s guidance radar were designed with low probability of intercept (LPI) capabilities. This means they use effective beam management to reduce the chance of their radar signals being intercepted and located by enemy radar warning receivers (RWR).

The RWRs on the IAF’s Su-30MKI and Mirage 2000 aircraft are largely based on third-generation receiver technology, lacking sufficient bandwidth. Only the Rafale’s RWR performance is decent. Indian RWRs are designed to alert pilots when locked onto or when a missile is fired at them. However, the RWRs on the Su-30MKI struggle greatly to detect the fire control signals from the J-10CE and PL-15E. It is highly likely that Su-30MKI pilots never realized they were locked onto, targeted, or fired upon until they were hit. They would think everything was normal until the moment of impact.

The French Rafale, while better, was severely jammed by PAF electronic warfare aircraft, making it difficult to distinguish the fire control radar guidance signals. Therefore, Indian fighters were shot down without warning, or while believing everything was normal, or were simply bewildered. The J-10CEs engaged them from over 160 kilometers away, beyond 200 kilometers.

At least the Mirage 2000s and Su-30MKIs near Srinagar and the MiG-29s likely had no idea they were being hit until impact. The French Rafale fighter near the Pakistani airbase was different. According to footage shot by Indians at the scene, the Rafale’s last action before being hit was deploying flares. Flares are typically used to counter infrared-guided dogfight missiles, not active radar-guided missiles like the PL-15. Using flares against a PL-15 is completely illogical.

This suggests that the Rafale’s RWR did eventually detect an incoming missile signal, but it might have misidentified it, perhaps thinking it was an infrared dogfight missile due to lack of response from the RWR about other threats. It then either automatically or manually deployed infrared flares. This proves that even the French Rafale in IAF service had significant problems with its warning system when facing the PL-15E.

In conclusion, the IAF on the morning of May 7 did their best. They used the equipment they had and tried to leverage their strengths while mitigating weaknesses. Their air-to-ground missiles did hit ground targets in Pakistan. However, the overall technological backwardness of the IAF’s system and individual combat equipment meant that the PAF, with its improved system combat capability, had gained a generational advantage. The PAF’s J-10CEs and PL-15 missiles effectively had a combat radius of 160 to 200 kilometers, while India’s effective range was 80 to 100 kilometers. This means Pakistan could fire from over twice the distance, and the Indian planes would be shot down often without even realizing it. This is the situation described by the Chinese official side.

However, I believe this official account is incomplete and hides some things. The real situation might be different. In a more realistic scenario, as I initially suspected, the J-10CEs might not have played a crucial role at all. The J-10CE’s performance might not be significantly superior when facing Rafales or even upgraded MiGs/Sukhois. It might have a slight edge against Russian aircraft, but perhaps none against French ones.

The real victory was likely achieved by Pakistan’s reconnaissance, AWACS, or electronic warfare aircraft. Indian aircraft were probably shot down by missiles guided by these platforms. The nature of these guiding platforms is currently unknown. Everyone talks about the J-10CE, but the J-10CE might have been useless in itself. It might have simply acted as a missile launcher. It would take off, wait, receive instructions to fire, fire the missile, and then withdraw. The J-10CE might not have done anything else; its only function was pressing the fire button. All the real work was done by the reconnaissance and guidance platforms. Indian planes were completely taken down by these platforms.

We don’t know what reconnaissance, guidance, or electronic jamming aircraft were used. This is clearly not Pakistan’s indigenous technology. This must be Chinese technology.

Let’s look at the likely true situation. Around 80 Indian combat aircraft, covering almost all types except LCA and MiG-21, participated. They were supported by A-50I and EMB-145 AWACS aircraft. In the aerial attack, each aircraft type tried to mitigate its weaknesses and leverage strengths. The IAF clearly understood its advantages and disadvantages and had prepared for this air battle for a long time, possibly since the 2019 engagement. The 2019 battle showed weaknesses on both sides, prompting them to acquire new equipment. India bought many French Rafales, while Pakistan bought from China.

After 2019, the idea of IAF planes flying over Pakistan’s border to drop precision-guided bombs like the AASM, as they did then, was no longer realistic. Pakistan’s border air defenses, including HQ-9BE surface-to-air missiles, are now very capable. Crossing the border would result in being shot down. Therefore, the IAF’s basic tactic this time was strictly stand-off attack. They stayed entirely outside Pakistan’s air defense identification zone, firing from long range. Su-30MKIs carried BrahMos-A missiles, Rafales carried SCALP-EG, and Mirage 2000s and Jaguars carried Israeli Rampage air-to-ground missiles. All aircraft fired from well within their own territory and retreated immediately.

In the Srinagar direction, the IAF used the Pir Panjal mountain range west of the Srinagar plain for cover. They used the mountains to mask themselves from Pakistani ground radars in the Islamabad direction. They deployed many attack aircraft to the Srinagar plain, taking off, immediately firing air-to-ground missiles, and staying low, not climbing above the mountains, to avoid detection by Pakistani radar. They fired and withdrew.

This suggests India thoroughly studied the terrain and understood their aircraft’s capabilities and weaknesses. This battle was not sudden; India had planned it for a long time, possibly years, waiting for a reason or excuse. The death of 26 people (implied context from news reports) served as the trigger, not the cause for rapid planning. The attack was meticulously designed. Simultaneous attacks from multiple directions like Srinagar and Poonch maximized the dispersal of Pakistani attention. This confirms the IAF’s attack was the result of years of careful planning.

However, despite the planning, a generational gap had opened up. The weapons acquired by Pakistan from China after 2019 belonged to a completely different era. Pakistan’s air force maintained multiple AWACS aircraft to counter IAF electronic jamming. The IAF, with its varied international fleet, lacked coordinated electronic warfare aircraft. Their large number of aircraft had data links that didn’t interconnect, making command and control difficult. They relied on pre-planned attack profiles.

Pakistan’s interception turned out to be much simpler than expected. It was essentially a beyond-visual-range engagement that felt like target practice for the PAF. With the J-10CEs and PL-15 missiles from China, it was like shooting targets. India had no idea where the Pakistani aircraft were, or that they were approaching. From Pakistan’s perspective, it was like aiming at a target practice dummy from a distance.

To avoid escalating the situation further, the PAF received instructions to only target Indian fighters that had fired air-to-ground missiles. Other Indian aircraft were to be ignored. In reality, the PAF locked onto 12 Indian fighters. If they had fired PL-15s at all of them, all could have been shot down. But to prevent escalation, they only shot down five combat aircraft and one drone. The rest were allowed to leave.

This account seems factual. The IAF was at a disadvantage with a distance gap of roughly one generation. They could only detect threats when they were within 100 kilometers, while Pakistan could see them from over 200 kilometers away and had already fired. Under these circumstances, shooting down 15 or 100 aircraft was not a question of possibility, but a question of decision. A generational gap existed.

The PAF did not cross the India-Pakistan border either. All Indian fighters shot down were engaged by PAF J-10CEs and PL-15 missiles from beyond 160 kilometers, around 200 kilometers. This was likely unimaginable for the IAF. Just six years prior, in the 2019 air battle, Pakistan used US F-16s with AMRAAM C5 missiles, which had a range of 20-30 kilometers, maybe up to 50 kilometers. This time, the engagement distance jumped to over 160 kilometers, around 200 kilometers.

Two IAF aircraft were shot down on the Srinagar plain, on the northern slope of the Pir Panjal mountain range. They were shot down there even though they stayed near the mountain slope, climbing only slightly to fire and then immediately turning back. Based on the IAF’s understanding of air combat, aircraft using mountain cover should be absolutely safe. Using AWACS, Pakistan should not have been able to see or target them, as they should have blended with the mountains.

But the unknown Pakistani AWACS, reconnaissance, or electronic warfare platform (or a single platform combining these functions) was able to distinguish fighters from the mountains. If it has such capabilities, it might approach the global surveillance capabilities of aircraft like the US P-8A. Such a system is clearly not something Pakistan would possess on its own; China must have provided it. This platform, whatever it is (perhaps three, four, or even just one unit, we don’t know), was key. It could perceive and monitor the situation on the Srinagar plain to a degree that allowed it to differentiate between the mountain terrain and the aircraft flying close to it. It could tell where aircraft were even while they were hugging the slopes. Previously, this was thought impossible, but this platform achieved it.

After detecting and monitoring, this platform guided the high-altitude launch of PL-15E missiles by PAF fighters. The PAF used AWACS-guided missile shots. The J-10CEs fired PL-15E from low altitude. The missile’s mid-course guidance was handled by the AWACS, and the terminal guidance used the missile’s active radar to lock onto the Indian fighter.

Here’s what that means: Imagine the border line. Indian fighters are on one side, Pakistani fighters on the other, around 200 kilometers apart. The Indian fighters had no idea where the Pakistani fighters were. The Pakistani fighters, it now seems, were not detected by the J-10CEs themselves, as they were outside the J-10CE’s combat radius, which isn’t that high. The platform with the truly high combat radius was the reconnaissance or guidance platform in the middle. This platform is very small, potentially a drone, equipped with extremely advanced electronic equipment. It would perform electronic jamming, preventing India from monitoring where Pakistani planes were. Their radars, including air defense radars, would be useless.

We don’t know where this guidance platform was located. It could have been ahead of the J-10CEs. It could also have been much higher, perhaps 5,000 kilometers up, looking down on everything. It could even have been behind the J-10CEs, covering a much larger area, seeing 400 kilometers ahead while the J-10CEs only saw 200. We don’t know what this platform is, but it’s incredible. It completely overlooked the entire battlefield. It knew exactly where all Pakistani and Indian aircraft were, even those hiding near the mountains.

This reconnaissance platform would acquire targets, lock onto them, and then instruct the J-10CEs to fire. The J-10CEs likely just took off and waited at low altitude, acting purely as missile launchers. They didn’t know the overall situation or the location of the Indian aircraft. They were just waiting for the reconnaissance platform to find and lock targets. Once given the command and target data, they would input it into their firing computer, which would guide the missile launch. After firing, the J-10CE’s job was done; they could go home.

The guidance for the missile’s mid-course flight came from the AWACS/reconnaissance platform. It would tell the missile where to fly and where the target was. When the missile was close enough, its own active radar would activate for terminal guidance and lock onto the Indian fighter. This means all the real capability was in that reconnaissance/guidance platform. Of course, the PL-15 missile itself needs to be capable of long range and accuracy and coordinate with the reconnaissance platform. The missile receives signals directly from the reconnaissance platform in the air, even though it was fired by the J-10CE. It is completely controlled and managed by the reconnaissance platform to hit its target.

So, where was this reconnaissance platform operating from? We don’t know. It seems possible it was around 400 kilometers away from the battle area, perhaps even further, conducting electronic jamming.

The PL-15E missile uses a highly reliable active electronically scanned array (AESA) seeker head. It has excellent search range and strong anti-jamming capability. In contrast, the radars and RWRs on IAF MiG-29s and Su-30s (like the R-77 radar warning equipment) are old; some might not even have basic warning functions. When the PL-15E’s active radar seeker turned on for terminal guidance, the Indian Su-30s likely didn’t even realize they were locked onto. They were shot down without warning because the missile wasn’t initially tracking them with its own radar. It was guided mid-course by the distant AWACS. The Indian planes couldn’t detect the AWACS because it was too far away. Only when the missile seeker activated, very close to them, should their RWR have alerted them, but the older Russian aircraft couldn’t even do that.

French Rafales were better. When the missile seeker activated nearby, they could sense an incoming missile. However, they might have misidentified it, perhaps thinking it was an infrared dogfight missile because they couldn’t figure out what was happening. This is why one Rafale deployed flares. But flares are useless against an active radar-guided missile like the PL-15.

So, the Chinese official account didn’t tell the whole truth. It hid a few things.

1. The weapons sold to Pakistan were not “castrated” export versions. They were likely the full-standard PL-15, capable of hitting nearly 200 kilometers, not the stated 145 km of the PL-15E export version. China officially states its exports are limited, but for Pakistan (fighting India), maybe they weren’t.
2. What is the reconnaissance/AWACS/guidance platform?. China hasn’t said what was sold to Pakistan. This unknown platform was the decisive factor. Indian planes were shot down by this platform, not the J-10CEs. The J-10CE just took off and acted as a passive launcher, waiting for the AWACS to find targets and say “fire”. Its performance compared to Rafale or MiG was irrelevant; it was just a missile rack.

The true superior technology is this unknown AWACS/reconnaissance/guidance platform. It completely surpassed India’s systems by a generation. The entire battle was orchestrated by this reconnaissance platform.

To put it simply, although the J-10CE itself (which is reportedly being phased out by the Chinese Air Force, but was designed years ago with the US military in mind) is a capable fighter, it wasn’t the key here. The speaker believes the official story is a lie, and the most crucial element is that unknown platform. It was like a “God” or a “droplet” (referencing The Three-Body Problem) or an alien presence on the battlefield. Everything else was from another era compared to it.

If India could find and shoot down this one (or three) reconnaissance platform(s), the Pakistani air force would be helpless. The J-10CEs would have to flee. If the battle then became close-quarters combat, the J-10CE’s advantages would be marginal; they are comparable to Rafales or MiGs in that scenario. While the PL-15 missile can hit far, the J-10CE itself cannot detect targets at that range. It’s a “bucket effect” – the missile’s range is limited by the fighter’s sensor range. The J-10CE cannot detect targets at 200km. Its signal needs to be relayed to the missile.

The true capability that allowed the PL-15’s range and ability to be utilized was that reconnaissance platform. Without it, the J-10CE cannot exploit its advantages. It’s like having a rifle that can shoot one kilometer, but your eyes can’t see one kilometer. You need a high-powered scope. Without the scope (the reconnaissance platform), you can’t see or hit the target at range. The key was the guidance system – the reconnaissance platform that could see the target.

So, despite all the discussion, the real situation hasn’t been fully revealed. What is that reconnaissance platform? We don’t know.

India spent a lot of money, perhaps seven or eight billion (currency unspecified, likely USD or equivalent), buying upgraded Rafales from France. These Rafales were significantly improved compared to standard versions and cost nearly double. The IAF did improve greatly since 2019 in areas like stand-off attack and using terrain. But they were still outmatched by the system Pakistan acquired from China (J-10CE and PL-15) which was a generation ahead.

The conclusion that J-10CE and PL-15 created a generational gap is completely wrong. All those people are misleading you. The J-10CE had no generational advantage and was useless. It was like a laborer carrying a missile launcher. The true generational leap was in the AWACS, reconnaissance, and guidance platform Pakistan bought from China. This platform conducted the entire battle.

So, while the official Chinese account highlights the J-10CE and PL-15, the real story is likely about a hidden, unknown Chinese platform that provided an overwhelming situational awareness and guidance advantage, rendering India’s sophisticated aircraft and tactics obsolete at range.

This concludes the analysis of the sources regarding the battle.